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BAR BRIEFS

REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Rattle vs. Soo Railway Co. Plaintiff, while driving team hitched
to wagon, was hit by train at crossing. He testified that he could see
the track for a distance of at least a quarter of a mile, that he looked
in the direction from which train might be coming, that he knew the
train was late and had not passed the crossing, and that he continued
to look in that direction until lie arrived at a point about five steps
from the track when lie loolked in the other direction and was almost
instantly struck. HELD: That plaintiff's failure to see the train
under such circumstances is legally incredible and such testimony must
be disregarded; that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident and injury and recovery, therefore, can not be had.
Weber vs. O'Connell. This was an election, contest in which all
questions except those presented by a ballot recount were waived, and
the final issue confined, by stipulation, to 21 absent voter ballots and
5 regular ballots. The absent voter ballots were not stamped and initialed as required by Sections 985 and tool. The regular ballots presented questions of intention on the part of the voter. IIEL): That
'the requirements of the statute with respect to marking and initialling
are mandatory, and if not complied with the ballots are void. The decision, separately announced on each of the other ballots, determines
that any mark, which indicates the voter's intention, is sufficient, but
where such mark, oil comparison with other marks on the ballot, does
not evidence the voter's intention, the vote can not le allowed.
Cedar Rapids National Bank vs. Snooz\v. Defendant purchased
machinery from H. Company, the manager of which was also director
in the Bank. Two notes were given by S. for $342.50 each, and they
carried the stipulation that failure to meet paynlent when due "remaining notes shall become due and payable at once." Note No. I was
transferred to bank before inaturity, and 1f. Company given credit on
books of Bank. Defendants claimed breach of warranty, offered to
return the machinery, and. refused payment of the first note when
due. Only part of the credit exchanged by Bank for Note No. i had
been "checked out" when Bank received notice of default and defendant's claims. Subsequently, however, it purchased the other note in
the same manner. IlEI.l): The Bank was not a holder in due course
and for value of Note No. 2. but a purchaser of past due and dishonored paper; that, as to Note No. i, the extent of recovery was limited
by the amount that had been checked out at the time it received notice
of default, and that the burden of proof was oil plaintiff to establish
the amount.
Stejskal vs. Darrow'. Plaintiff's daughter, age 30, last seen alive
and in apparent normal physical condition about three o'clock Thursday afternoon, came under defendant's care soon afterwards. About
five o'clock defendant (a physician) took her to a hospital. She was
then very ill and suffering great pain. The hospital being unable to
provide room, she was taken back to the doctor's office and left on a
couch with little or no attention. Monday morning she was found
dead, the cause of which was disclosed as peritonitis, hemorrhage and
shock brought about by rupture of the uterus by instrumental inter-
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ference with pregnancy. HELD: That, regardless of whether defendant performed the operation, he was guilty of the grossest negligence in the care administered, and the jury was justified in finding
that such negligence was responsible for death; and that plaintiff was
entitled to recover, as damages, the value of the loss of work and services which he was reasonably entitled to expect from her, also, for expenses of the funeral, but not for the loss of the society and companionship of such unmarried daughter.
State ex rel Friend et al vs. District Court et al. As part of a
mass of litigation it appears that G-B Company defaulted in a garnishment proceeding against it, judgment being also by default against the
main defeiidant. In the delay that followed, disputes arose between
stockholders in G-13 Company, some of which stipulated to dismiss
proceedings to set aside the default. Action was then commenced in
State District Court to have the property of G-B Company sequestered
and receiver appointed. Receiver was appointed by the State Court,
possession taken and regular course pursued. Within four months
petition in bankruptcy was filed in U. S. District Court by creditors of
G-B Company. HELD: That the Supreme Court, under its power
of supervision over inferior courts, will intervene in such case and
enjoin further proceedings by the State Court and the receiver until
the detennination of the issue in the federal court, in order to avoid
a possible conflict of jurisdiction, but that such injunction will not
extend to the payment of necessary expenses, such as rent and clerk
hire, to protect the business.
THE PUBLIC-AND A CODE OF ETHICS
The August issue of the American Bar Association Journal contains an article on "Does the Public Need a Code of Ethics Too"? by
Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, formerly of the Supreme Court of North
Dakota. In the same issue appears, also, an editorial, entitled "The
Party of the Third Part", which we quote in full, towit:
No problem, least of all one so complicated as that of the administration of justice, can be understood or dealt with effectively unless
all of the main agencies involved are given due attention. For this
reason it is well from time to time to turn from the responsibility of
the Bench and Bar in this important field and consider the obligations
and performance of the party of the third part-perhaps the party of
the first part from the standpoint of importance-viz: the public.
For it may be taken for granted that unless there is co-operation of
all three factors to a reasonable extent, no results of real importance
are likely to be achieved.
The public is, of course, a vague and elusive entity, and, in consequence, it is generally defined in accordance with the particular need
of the occasion. Sometimes it is idealized as an impeccable, disinterested, patriotic body that is deeply resentful of defects in the administration of justice and that is demanding that they should be done away
with on pain of its grave displeasure. Sometimes it is denounced as a
body of indifferent citizens who neglect their duties at the polls and
thereby permit the wrong sort of men and measures to prevail. Sometimes, when subjected to examination such as appears in Judge Johnson's article, it appears to be made up in considerable part of voters who

